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I. Introduction
To date, the process of economic and political assimilation in the EU has been
the most active political and regulatory response to the brave new world of global
market integration. It represents a zenith in policymakers’ recognition that recent
material changes in the world economy require fundamental adjustments to the
political structure of states. EU Member States are the trailblazers of change and, as
such, the manner by which they approach and resolve their integration quandaries is
bound to reflect on future developments in the international arena.
In this context, the EU's corporate income tax policy is particularly revealing.
Over the last generation, the European Community and the subsequent EU have been
remarkably successful in removing impediments to free trade among Member States.
This resulted in an accelerated level of economic integration and allowed the
emergence of pan-European markets and corporate structures. 1 In sharp contrast to its
ability to harmonize its monetary policy and remove trade barriers, however, the EU's
failure to implement an effective harmonization of its Members States’ income tax
systems is considered the Achilles heel of its strive for economic integration. 2
Although most Member States lowered their corporate tax rates and broadened their
tax bases during the 1990's, this largely uncoordinated sequence of initiatives did not
take the sting out of many tax barriers faced by investors in the common market. 3
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I wish to thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Philip Baker, Gadi Benshalom, Michael Graetz and Tom O’Shea
for all their help throughout the years, and, more specifically, for commenting on this paper.
1
ROLF DIEMER & THOMAS NEALE, The European Union's Longer-Term Plans for Introducing a
Common Consolidated Tax Base for the EU-wide Activities of Companies, 89 Cahiers de droit fiscal
international 69, 71 (2004).
2
WOLFGANG SCHON, The European Commission's Report on Company Taxation: A magic Formula for
European Taxation, 42 European Taxation 276, 276 (2002) (providing an overview of the EU's failure
in harmonizing its corporate income tax during the last 40 years).
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JADRANKA DJUROVIC-TODOROVIC, Corporate Income Tax in EU Countries Comparative Analysis at
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Accordingly, some commentators consider the development of an EU (business)
income tax policy as vital to achieving the EU's goal of economic integration. 4
The central role that taxes play in the political and economic arenas has led to
what may be understood as a tradition of national chauvinism with regard to tax
policy. An attempt to overcome this legacy, by formulating an effective corporate tax
policy, can be seen as a test of the EU's ability to attain meaningful economic
integration. The EU's recent enlargement, moreover, has opened a window for
meaningful reforms in tax policy. The need to integrate a great number of new
Member States, some with very poor traditions of tax administration, into the EU
market system may prove a constitutive moment. This window of opportunity,
however, may soon draw to a close. Once this reconstruction momentum dies down,
it is possible that EU tax policy will be crippled into a status quo deadlock due to
interest group politics. 5
This Article's emphasis on the acute need for rethinking EU corporate tax
policy justifies a greater discussion of the unique function of corporate taxation.
Scholars widely recognize that the corporate form is the most important investment
vehicle for transnational investments. Corporate tax is also believed to be a
progressive component in the finance of the state (this is especially true in the EU,
where consumption and wage taxes comprise a significant part of the tax mix). 6 The
friction between the different roles of the corporate income tax makes it the melting
point of income tax policy in our era. The manner by which these inherent
complexities are resolved in the EU in the next few years may very well impact the
manner by which income tax policy develops in response to globalization.
This need for reconsideration is relevant now more than ever before.
Recently, the British government issued a detailed proposal for altering its
international tax regime from a credit to an exemption system. 7 Britain is the major
EU economy that (still) taxes the worldwide income of its residents. If this reform
takes place, it can have radical consequences. In addition, the United States is
considering shifting to a more territorial regime and may soon follow in Britain’s
steps. If these two major economies were to shift to a territorial system, other
countries are likely to soon follow, resulting in what may become a domino effect of
territorial taxation. Once this landslide begins, and residence taxation diminishes,
policymakers may find that current sourcing conventions cannot bear the enormous
pressure laid upon them to measure and tax income comprehensively. Because the
EU is at the forefront of contemporary sourcing debate, Member States and other
countries will be relied upon to carefully examine for whom the EU bells would
ring—and their future actions will be determined accordingly.
This Article focuses on how the EU corporate tax regime should be reformed.
It critically analyzes the current proposals for reform and offers its own alternative
model.

4

The European Council set a strategic goal that the EU becomes the most competitive, dynamic and
knowledge-based economy in the world. See Point 5 of the Presidency Conclusions from the Lisbon
European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000.
5
LANNOO KAREL & LEVIN MATTIAS, An EU Company Without an EU Tax? A Corporate Tax Action
Plan for Advancing The Lisbon Process at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/docs/conference/corporate_taxation
.pdf xx15
6
OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2005, 2006 Edition 73 (2006(
7
HM TREASURY, Taxation of the Foreign Profits of Companies: A Discussion Document. (2007), at
http://www.hm-treasury.go.uk/media/E/9/consult_foreign_profits020707.pdf.
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Part II explains the tax obstacles that the simultaneous operation of twentyseven tax systems imposes on attempts to make the EU economy more efficient and
competitive. It further outlines the EU Commission’s (hereinafter, “the
Commission”) strategy to reduce these obstacles. Part III provides a detailed
description and a critical assessment of the fourth proposal, the Home State Taxation
initiative (hereinafter, "the HST initiative"), generally considered the only proposal
that may become operational in the foreseeable future. This Article demonstrates why
it should nevertheless be rejected, or limited significantly. In Part IV, this Article
briefly explores the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base initiative (hereinafter
“the CCCTB initiative”). It concludes that while the CCCTB is better than the HST
initiative, both proposals share some fundamental deficiencies. There are doubts,
however, about whether the CCCTB will become operational in the near future. Part
V delineates the Article’s proposal for desirable corporate income tax reform in the
EU. It promotes the core idea that broad incremental reforms, such as the HST,
reduce—rather than increase—the chances of achieving overall comprehensive
unitary reform of the entire EU corporate income tax. Instead of advocating for these
reforms, this Article argues that the Commission should provide one comprehensive
unitary reform in a hard-to-tax sector, such as the financial, technology and IPintensive or shipping-and-aviation sectors. Part VI compares this Article's proposal
with the HST initiative. Through this comparison, this Article draws out the
principles through which a transitory regime might correspond with the long-term
objective of comprehensive EU corporate tax reform. Part VII provides some brief
conclusions.

II. The Issue in Context: The EU Corporate Tax Strategy
A. A Tax Perspective of Economic Integration
Policymakers wishing to reform the EU’s corporate tax policy operate in
difficult terrain. International taxation is a field in which unilateralism is rarely an
option. A single sovereign wishing to reformulate its tax system is often required to
embark on lengthy treaty amendment processes or be exposed to retaliation by other
sovereigns. Moreover, it is difficult to facilitate an effective common action with
regard to the EU’s income tax policy. There is a firm commitment, entrenched in the
EU’s constitutive treaties, that any initiative related to direct taxation is to go through
strict procedural process and must attain unanimous agreement from all Member State
representatives in the EU Council for Economic Affairs. 8 The federative nature of the
EU seems to prescribe that Member States are to retain some control over the rates,
subsidies and expenditures associated with the corporate tax under any future tax
reform.
There are two political impediments to forming a unified EU corporate tax
policy. First, most of the pressure for a unified EU taxation comes from the
bureaucratic ranks of the Commission and from the judicial interpretations of EC law
by the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, "the ECJ") rather than from the
business community. Lacking active business pressure and support from Member

8

EC treaty § 94. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & ALVIN C. WARREN JR., Income Tax
Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1190-1
(2006); CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union: The
Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 781 (2004).
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States, the Commission finds it difficult to politically mobilize such large-scaled tax
reform.
Second, it is difficult for Member States to align with the Commission's plans,
since so many aspects of these plans are unclear. While a number of objectives are
repeatedly emphasized in all of the Commission's initiatives (e.g., enhancing
transparency), the Commission has yet to figure out what the ultimate level of
coordination should be and how much competition it aspires to promote.
A situation in which twenty-seven different national corporate tax regimes
operate simultaneously within a supposedly internal market gives rise to differential
effective tax costs on similar commercial activities taking place within that market.
These cost differences jeopardizes the mobility of investments within the internal
market and conflicts with the ambition for a fully integrated and competitive market.
The ongoing cross-border integration of markets and the enhanced mobility of
the means of production (e.g., capital and intangible assets) intensify the threat of
tax—as well as other types of regulatory—competition. The existence of many
different tax regimes allows investors to tax-shop among jurisdictions to minimize
their tax liabilities. Member States thus have incentives to structure their tax systems
so as to attract certain types of investments and activities. 9 The different tax costs on
different taxpayers or economic activities are often considered to be the distortive and
inequitable dark side of the EU's economic integration. 10 Recently, this tension
between economic integration and the sustainability of the income tax base has
surfaced in a number of ECJ rulings. In those rulings, the ECJ concluded that a
number of Member States’ anti-avoidance tax regimes discriminate against foreign
investments in a way that infringes upon the freedom of establishment. 11
B. Tax Obstacles Imposed on EU Integration by the Twenty-Seven Separate
Accounting Corporate Tax Regimes Operating Within it
When a country employs a separate accounting tax system, it, in a sense, ringfences the income-producing activities taking place in its jurisdiction. When an
economic unit operates in multiple jurisdictions, the attempt to assign some of its
income to a specific jurisdiction has two main implications. First, under the separate
accounting system, the economic activity is measured in accordance with the tax base
and the tax accounting conventions of the jurisdiction to which it is attributed (even if
it is conducted by a non-resident). Second, and more importantly, the activity is
appraised separately from related economic activities carried out by the same
economic entity in different jurisdictions. Accordingly, every separate accounting
system has its own transfer pricing rules for bifurcating integrated economic activity
9

On this issue see HANS-GEORG PETERSEN, Globalization, Capital Flight, and Capital Income
Taxation: A European Perspective, 33 Tax Notes Int'l 887, 888-9 (2004) (suggesting that members
from the EU community vote with their feet and leaving the high tax jurisdictions); EU COMMISSION,
Towards and Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing Companies with a
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities 7 (2001); VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA
GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business Profits and Tax
Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003) (providing an overview over the various attempts of the EU
to counter practices which it considered as harmful tax competition during the late 1990's); MICHAEL P.
DEVEREUX, Issues in the Taxation of Income from Foreign Portfolio and Direct Investment, in Taxing
Capital Income in the European Union 224-9, (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000) (providing a literature
review on the matter).
10
ALEX ESSON, Tax Competition and Investment Incentives, 2 The EC Tax Journal 63 (1996/1997).
11
DAVID WILLIAMS, Freedom of Establishment and Double Taxation Agreements, 19 European Law
Review 313 (1994) (discussing a case in which the ECJ decided that the anti discrimination rationales
have precedent over DTTs).
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occurring in more than one jurisdiction. Nevertheless, all jurisdictions use some form
of the arm's-length standard to source related-party transactions. Generally, the arm'slength standard employs a hypothetical inquiry as to how unrelated parties would
price a certain transaction, and requires each corporate entity within a Multinational
Enterprise (hereinafter, “MNE”) group to report accordingly. However, the arm'slength standard, as it is currently enshrined in a plethora of transfer pricing
regulations, is a conceptually flawed, practically inept, and extremely inefficient and
burdensome mechanism to source many complex affiliated transactions. 12
Unlike confederative nations, Member States’ income tax base rules and tax
accounting principles lack a general uniformity. The existence of twenty-seven
separate sets of tax-accounting rules contradicts the EU’s goal of forming an
integrated and competitive internal market. Furthermore, it imposes some tax-costs
on taxpayers operating in more than one Member State, creating a bias in favor of
domestic investment. This set of penalties on cross-border operations creates four
types of problems. 13 First, European MNEs and tax authorities must invest
considerable amount of resources to allocate profits and losses arising from related
parties' transactions. These transfer pricing costs are a major source of concern
because the volume of affiliated transactions within integrated MNE business
structures is only increasing. 14
Second, MNEs operating in the EU are unable to fully attain intra-group
income tax consolidation that would be otherwise available for corporate groups with
solely domestic operations. This inability to consolidate losses, and the excessive
realization of profits in cases of corporate reorganization, impose severe tax
distortions on the efficient allocation of resources and the choice of business
structure. 15 Following the ECJ's Marks & Spencer ruling there has been some
development in this area; 16 however, MNEs are still unable to fully consolidate their
losses.
Third, European MNEs are forced to spend vast resources to comply with each
domestic tax regime and its associated double taxation treaties.
Fourth, in cases of cross-border corporate reorganizations, European MNEs
may still incur excessive tax costs associated with the realization of profits from
appreciated assets.
12

ILAN BENSHALOM, Sourcing the "Unsourceable": The Cost SharingRegulations and the Sourcing of
Affilated-Intangible Related Transactions, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2007) (providing a critique of the
arm’s length standard.
13
EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 223 (2001); SABINE D.
SELBACH, The Harmonization of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the European
Community and their Interrelationship, 18 Conn. J. Int'l L. 523, 528-9 (2003).
14
EU COMMISSION, Taxation Papers: European Tax Survey 64-5 (2004); EU COMMISSION, Towards
and Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities (2001) (stressing that there is a concrete concern that
companies which are making bona fide attempts to comply with complex and often conflicting
transfer-pricing regimes are penalized by them); EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal
Market SEC(2001)1681 261-8 (2001) (mentioning that transfer-pricing was mentioned as the most
important issue for business representatives and that due to the lack of unaffiliated transactions to
which one may compare aggressive transfer-pricing auditing often result in double taxation on the one
hand and manipulation on the other).
15
EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 249-52 (2001)
(suggesting that there is significant evidence that the lack of consolidation results in the over taxation
of European MNEs).
16
ECJ, 13 December 2005, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s
Inspector of Taxes).
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Although the incongruence among the different tax regimes discriminately
imposes tax-related compliance costs against international investments, it also opens a
wide array of tax reduction opportunities for well-advised taxpayers. Such taxpayers
exploit inconsistencies in tax rules to engage in planning, arbitrage-seeking and
avoidance activities. 17 The different effective tax rates and deficient transfer pricing
rules allow MNEs to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions. Thus, as the next Part of
this Article discusses, tax-related costs mainly affect small and medium sized
enterprises. These businesses bear tax costs when they expand to other Member
States, but are unable to use rule inconsistencies to reduce their overall tax liability.

C. The Role of the Commission in Formulating a Tax Reform Strategy
In a breakthrough study published in 2001, 18 the Commission outlined a
strategy to deal with the above-mentioned obstacles. This strategy has two main
pillars. First, the Commission stressed the desirability of establishing a European
corporate tax regime with a uniform consolidated tax base in which the core tax
accounting unit is the MNE itself. 19
The second pillar relates to the Commission's strategy to relieve the tax
obstacles it identified. Its biggest dilemma was whether to endorse large-scale
corporate tax reform or to support small incremental reforms. While the payoffs of
the former are considerably greater, its political costs are enormous. The Commission
proposed to deal with this problem by distinguishing between targeted and
comprehensive remedies. 20 While the first—targeted remedies—tailors a specific
remedy for each problem, the second—comprehensive remedies—seeks to facilitate a
major change in Member States' tax systems and to encompass a remedy for all of the
obstacles identified in the 2001 study. The Commission emphasized that it would
promote both types of remedies. 21
This Article focuses on two of the targeted remedies that the Commission set
forth—the HST initiative and, to a lesser extent, the CCCTB initiative. In particular,
it examines the interrelationship between the HST initiative's objectives and the
longer-term solution of a comprehensive EU corporate tax regime.
The Commission presented the HST and CCCTB initiatives as two of four
alternative proposals for corporate tax consolidation. 22 Even though the Commission
presented all four as comprehensive solutions, both the HST and CCCTB initiatives
should be regarded as (temporary) targeted solutions. All four proposals, however,
17

MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, A New Era in Corporate Taxation, 41 Tax Notes Int'l 415, 416 (2006)
(mentioning that the two main ways companies shift income is affiliated debt financing and price
manipulation of affiliated transactions); JADRANKA DJUROVIC-TODOROVIC, Corporate Income Tax in
EU Countries Comparative Analysis at http://facta.junis.ni.ac.yu/facta/eao/eao2002/eao2002-08.pdf
xx62
18
EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 (2001).
19
EU COMMISSION, Towards and Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy for Providing
Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for their EU-Wide Activities 16 (2001); EU
COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
European Economic and Social Committee: An Internal Market Without Company Tax obstacles
Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives and Remaining Challenges 5 (2003).
20
EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 306 (2001).
21
EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament
and the European Economic and Social Committee: An Internal Market Without Company Tax
obstacles Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives and Remaining Challenges 3 (2003(
22
VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business
Profits and Tax Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003).
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recognize the need to create appropriation formulas to allocate the revenues of this
newly formulated MNE tax-base among Member States. This common thread reflects
on the Commission’s conscious decision not to rely its long-term tax reform on arm'slength sourcing techniques associated with separate accounting.
The Commission has decided to promote the CCCTB initiative and has a
formed a working group to make it operational. However, as discussed in Part VI,
formulating a comprehensive corporate income tax base and establishing allocation
mechanisms that would apply to almost all EU corporations is complicated. Reaching
political agreement on this issue is even harder. Thus, even though the CCCTB
would be optional—that is, MNEs could choose whether to comply with it or with
existing rules—the CCCTB is far from being operational. The HST initiative is
currently being examined in a pilot study conducted by the Commission. The Article,
therefore, devotes much of its analysis to describe and critically analyze it.

III. The HST Initiative
Unlike the other three proposals, the HST initiative is not a purely sourcebased corporate tax reform but one that involves an amalgam of source and residency
tax-considerations. Additionally, unlike the other three proposals, it did not originate
from the Commission but from the joint writings of two prominent European tax
scholars: Sven-Olof Lodin and Malcolm Gammie. 23 The Commission, however,
limited the scholars’ proposal and restricted its application only to small and medium
business enterprises (hereinafter, SMEs).
To fully understand the HST initiative, one must first understand the
disproportional tax burdens faced by SMEs engaged in cross-border business
activities. Although SMEs comprise the spinal-column of the EU economy, 24 their
participation in cross-border activities is considerably lower than larger
corporations, 25 in part because of the grave burden imposed by tax obstacles. SMEs
are subject to proportionally higher tax compliance costs than large corporations. 26
They also lack the ability of larger MNEs to shift income through tax planning
because they have lower capital reserves and access to expertise. 27 Additionally,
23

SVEN-OLOF LODIN & MALCOLM GAMMIE, The Taxation of the European Company, 39 Euro. Tax.
286 (1999); SVEN-OLOF LODIN & MALCOLM GAMMIE, Home State Taxation (2000); SEVEN-OLOF
LODIN & MALCOLM GAMMIE, Home State Taxation at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/HST_book_summary.pdf
24
EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation
Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 6, 15-6 (2005) (pointing out that 99% of entities I the internal market
are SMEs and that they employ 66% of the workforce in the EU, and provides detailed figures about
their importance to the internal market).
25
EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot
Scheme 3 (2005); EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation
Tax Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible
Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 17-25 (2005).
26
EU COMMISSION, Taxation Papers: European Tax Survey 4 & 37-8 (2004) (mentioning that
compliance costs for medium firms is around 30% of their taxes paid, in comparison for about 2% for
large companies, and that the compliance costs are much higher for those companies engaged in crossborder investments).
27
EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 299 (2001).
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some start-up SMEs in the technology driven sector are particularly sensitive to the
inability to consolidate losses during the first years of operation. 28 All these factors
meaningfully hinder the integration of the internal market and its competitiveness.
The Commission thus adopted the HST initiative to provide a remedy for the
distortive burden placed upon SMEs that operate (or wish to operate) in more than
one Member State. 29 It was viewed as a quickly attainable and politically favorable
remedy that did not have the agreement costs necessary for fundamental reformation
of existing tax rules. 30
The HST initiative offers an elective system to both Member States and SMEs
based upon the principle of mutual recognition by tax authorities. 31 In Member States
that join the HST initiative, SMEs could choose to file tax returns in their country of
residence, under the nation’s applicable tax rules, for their operations in all of the
participating Member States. 32 Thus, under the HST initiative, affiliated cross-border
transactions would be subject to withholding taxes. Although the HST initiative does
not prescribe unitary treatment of the MNE, SMEs electing to file tax returns under it
are more likely to be residents in countries that allow group consolidation. For this
reason, this Article avoids discussing the unique set of problems that emerge when the
HST initiative is implemented in unconsolidated settings. 33
Where MNEs do consolidate their profits, their net income, as computed by
the country of residence, will be divided among the participating Member States by an
agreed-upon payroll- and/or turnover-based appropriation formula. 34 The income
allocated to each jurisdiction will be subject to the statutory corporate tax rate

28

EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot
Scheme 6 (2005); EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation
Tax Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible
Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 29 (2005).
29
EU COMMISSION, Outline of a Possible Experimental Application of Home State Taxation to Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2004(.
30
EU COMMISSION, Company Taxation in the Internal Market SEC(2001)1681 379-89 (2001).
31
This would include the treatment of foreign income, the administration of the tax filing process, the
definitions of income and the corporate consolidation rules. SABINE D. SELBACH, The Harmonization
of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the European Community and their
Interrelationship, 18 Conn. J. Int'l L. 523, 530 (2003).
32
EU COMMISSION, Outline of a Possible Experimental Application of Home State Taxation to Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (2004); CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the
European Union: The Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 779 (2004).
33
In those cases where the MNE subject to the HST is not consolidating profits there is an additional
source of difficulty with the treatment of foreign income. See: CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax
Harmonization in the European Union: The Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 793
(2004( (pointing out that imposing the country of resident's foreign tax law on foreign subsidiaries may
result in over or under taxation of those subsidiaries).
34
EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot
Scheme 23-4 (2005(. If the HST initiative adopts payroll as a sole factor, this decision may have very
problematic implications. Payroll does not take into account wage and consumption power
differentiations in different countries. Tax authorities will find it difficult to define, and consistently
implement, a comprehensive unitary system without a careful comprehensive definition of what
comprises an employee for unitary tax purposes.
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applicable to that jurisdiction. MNEs operating in sectors subject to specific tax rules
(e.g., financial services and shipping) are excluded from the HST initiative. 35
The definition of eligibility is one attribute of the HST initiative in which the
residence state is denied any type of discretion. The HST initiative allows companies
to participate in it only if they employ fewer than 250 employees, have an annual
turnover of less than 50 million euros, or carry a balance sheet of less than 43 million
euros. 36 Furthermore, the HST initiative would be supplemented with an agreed-upon
tie-breaker rule with regard to corporate residency determinations and a general antiavoidance rule that restrains the ability of participating MNEs to engage in residencyshopping and tax-motivated expatriation.
The revenue impact of adopting the HST initiative is not entirely clear and
would depend upon both the formulary design and the number of Member States and
corporations that opt to participate in it. 37 It is nevertheless expected to remove taxinduced foreign investment barriers on SMEs, in a manner that would lead to greater
competitiveness, economic integration and welfare in the EU. 38 In light of the low
current levels of SME participation in cross-border enterprises, there seems to be
general agreement that the ease and speed of implementing the HST initiative are its
true virtues and that there is really little to lose by offering the HST initiative option to
SMEs.
The HST initiative seems to take the middle path between the Commission's
targeted and comprehensive agendas. It targets the SME sector and tries to
incorporate some unitary aspects in its taxation. Even though it incorporates these
unitary features, the HST initiative is not perceived as a comprehensive solution, but
rather as a remedy to the SMEs’ existing difficulty in operating within the common
market. This perception, in light of its middle path approach, is interesting because
the unitary alternative is typically associated with the Commission’s ambition to
promote a comprehensive long-term corporate tax regime rather than a targeted
remedy. Given this perception, this Article inquires about whether the HST initiative
helps to promote a long-term, comprehensive EU corporate tax regime.
This Article’s evaluation of the HST initiative distinguishes among critical
assessments directed at the initiative’s principled decision to shift away from separate
accounting methods towards a unitary method and explores the difficulties that are
unique to the HST. This Article mainly deals with the latter discussion.
The HST initiative attempts to implant a unitary system in an international
arena that subscribes to separate accounting norms. Tax authorities may find it
35

EU COMMISSION, Outline of a Possible Experimental Application of Home State Taxation to Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises 5 (2004).
36
EU COMMISSION, Home State Taxation, EU Commission. (2006), at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/home_state_taxation/index_en.htm.; EU
COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the
Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot Scheme 14 (2005)
37
In a simulation conducted using data from SMEs in Sweden, only a slight revenue loss of revenue
was reported, which was attributed to the (desirable) ability of SMEs to better consolidate their losses
under the HST initiative. EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax
Obstacles of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home
State Taxation Pilot Scheme 11 (2005).
38
EU COMMISSION, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation
Pilot Scheme SEC(2005) 1785 55-61 (2005).
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difficult to prevent profit-shifting and reduce administrative costs when MNEs that
elect to consolidate under HST programs have foreign operations in non-HST
countries. This Article focuses on those flaws that result from the HST initiative's
unconditional embrace of residence jurisdictions' tax bases, which is a futile attempt
to ameliorate source taxation by highlighting the importance of tax residency.
First, and most noticeably, the HST initiative envisions the simultaneous
operation of multi-unitary systems (on top of the existing separate accounting
systems). This notion of tax-regime plurality undermines the HST initiative’s main
objective: to reduce tax compliance and administrative costs. For example, it would
force parties to litigate domestic cases with reference to foreign law, involve
complicated and arbitrary tax computation in cases of a change in corporate
residency, and necessitate excessive cooperation among tax authorities in audits and
investigations. 39
Second, the anti-avoidance rule suggested by the HST initiative may be
effective in preventing direct tax-motivated corporate expatriations. Nevertheless, it
is unlikely to be effective with regard to newly established enterprises or corporate
mergers and acquisitions that result in a change of corporate tax residency.
Third, the adoption of the HST initiative may result in massive tax
distortions. 40 The HST initiative does not elaborate on how its adoption by a number
of Member States is supposed to lead to any form of voluntary (or rapid) tax base
convergence of their tax systems. Without such convergence, taxpayers with similar
economic incomes that are located in the same residence and/or source jurisdiction
may be subject to completely different effective tax rates. 41 Put differently, the HST
is likely to perpetuate tax distortions on investments within the internal market. 42
Furthermore, the fact that corporate residency is essentially a legal fiction could help
induce tax-base competition among states to attract companies into their
jurisdictions. 43
Finally, it is common knowledge that electability in tax rules is a type of
bonus for those businesses engaged with tax planners and/or tax haven jurisdictions. 44
For instance, assume there are two Member States, both of which are low tax
jurisdictions (e.g., Ireland and Luxemburg). One of those jurisdictions may aim to
join the HST framework to engage in headquarter/residency tax-base competition.
The other may elect not to participate to allow income-shifting to affiliated
subsidiaries located in its jurisdiction. Tax planners may choose to allocate the
corporate residency in a country with a favorable tax base (e.g., in a country that
39

VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business
Profits and Tax Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003); PETER BIRCH SORENSEN, Company Tax
Reform in the European Union, 11 International Tax and Public Finance 91, 102 (2004).
40
JOANN MARTENS WEINER & JACK MINTZ, An Exploration of Formula Approtionment in the
European Union, 42 European Taxation 346, 348 (2002).
41
This differentiation of effective tax rates, especially on the source jurisdiction, may put in question
the political viability of the proposal. BJORN WESTBERG, Consolidated Corporate Tax Bases for EU
wide Activities: Evaluation of four Proposals Presented by the European Commission, see id. at 322
Xx333; CHARLES E. MCLURE, Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union: The
Commission's Proposals, 36 Tax Notes Int'l 775, 788-9 (2004).
42
VIERI CERIANI & SILVIA GIANNINI, Trends in EU Proposals on Taxation of Transnational Business
Profits and Tax Coordination, 2003 WTD 178-11 (2003).
43
SABINE D. SELBACH, The Harmonization of Corporate Taxation & Accounting Standards in the
European Community and their Interrelationship, 18 Conn. J. Int'l L. 523, 537 (2003).
44
BJORN WESTBERG, Consolidated Corporate Tax Bases for EU wide Activities: Evaluation of four
Proposals Presented by the European Commission, 42 European Taxation 322, 330 (2002) (pointing
that by definition elective regimes invites planning).
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exempts foreign income and employs relatively lax transfer-pricing rules, has a
favorable treaty network, calculates depreciation at accelerated rates, etc.). This could
be done simultaneously with the shifting of income (through “traditional” debt
financing and transfer-pricing loopholes) to a subsidiary located in another low-tax
jurisdiction that is not participating in the HST arrangement. If this subsidiary is a
resident of a Member State, it would enjoy the protections of the EU parent, as well
as, the interest and royalties directives that the parent benefits from. While general
anti-avoidance rules may be useful to circumvent bluntly artificial transactions,
careful tax planning would put most of these structures within the gray area that is
beyond the effective reach of these rules.
The assumption that the revenue impact of the HST initiative will be minimal
should be reconsidered. Member States with high-tax jurisdictions that will take part
in the HST initiative may have their corporate tax base significantly stripped.
Through simple tax planning, SMEs would be able to reduce their taxable earnings in
jurisdictions with high corporate taxes, even though those high-tax jurisdictions will
still enjoy the privilege of imposing their relatively high statutory tax rates.
To conclude, the Commission's decision to promote the political feasibility of
the HST initiative came at the cost of conceding the legitimacy of some of its flaws.
Allowing the barbarians within its walls, the HST initiative may result in severe
revenue loss and fail to relieve tax compliance and administrative burdens. Moreover,
if adopted, the HST initiative may actually jeopardize the EU’s progress toward
adopting a comprehensive unitary tax system. Its flaws may erode the political
legitimacy for a unitary solution and consume too much of the Commission's tax
expertise. The HST initiative’s wide array of distortions will provide incentives to
form taxpayers' lobbies, making it difficult for the Commission to advance the
solution of a comprehensive unitary system. Because of these flaws, the HST
initiative is indefensible in its current format.
For the HST initiative to be justified, the Commission must significantly lower
its costs by limiting the HST regime to small businesses. The HST solution is
suitable for cases where a coffee-shop owner in Baarle-Hertog (Belgium) wishes to
open a coffee shop across the street in Baarle-Nassau (Netherlands). Because of its
abuse potential, the HST initiative is not suitable for businesses of a larger scale. A
start-up company that subscribes to the HST initiative, while being a resident of
Luxemburg but operating a research center in Germany and a production line in
France, may cost the treasuries of France and Germany a lot of revenue. Since the
HST initiative offers a transitory solution, its negative impact on the chances of
attaining greater comprehensive tax harmonization in the future is one of its major
weaknesses.

IV. The CCCTB Initiative
Under the CCCTB initiative, Member States would allow MNEs within them
to elect whether to report all of their operations under a single, consolidated, EU
corporate tax base. The initiative does not require MNEs to make the election, and
they can choose to continue using the twenty-seven separate accounting systems
instead. The net income of the group would be allocated by an appropriation formula.
MNEs participating in the CCCTB may choose to give up the tax benefits of shifting
income in return for the ability to consolidate their losses and relieve their transferpricing compliance burden. The Commission has considered recently tying a tax
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reform similar to the CCCTB to its European company (the Societas Europaea)
initiative. 45
The other two comprehensive proposals advocated by the Commission’s 2001
study are basically stricter mandatory versions of the CCCTB. 46 The adoption of
these stricter versions would remove tax-obstacles on economic integration more
effectively than the CCCTB. However, because they are mandatory, they require
profound levels of harmonization and cooperation. Therefore, these two more
comprehensive proposals are unlikely to gain Member States’ support in the current
political atmosphere. Although both proposals provide Member States with tax rate
flexibility, Member States are unlikely to agree to completely harmonize their tax
bases.
The CCCTB initiative is operational because of its optional nature.
Consequently, however, it suffers from this fundamental weakness; it tries to
simultaneously advance both tax uniformity and the taxpayers’ choice to elect
whether they want to be subject to it. Accordingly it has two main draw backs: First,
it requires intensive cooperation and agreement among Member States that desire to
offer such uniformity. Even on the most superficial level, one has to recognize that
formulating an all-encompassing corporate tax base involves a lot of difficult-toagree-upon technical aspects. 47 Many of the difficulties are not merely technical, but
also represent deeply rooted ideological tax policy divisions. It is therefore difficult
to see how Member States could reconcile many of the issues that this type of
corporate-base formulation raises in the near future. 48 Moreover, like the other
45

The Commission’s idea was that the Societas Europaea may be used as a platform for adopting a
consolidated common European tax base. This consolidated tax base is supposed to be both a pilot for a
European corporate tax system and an incentive to lure European companies to incorporate under the
new status. However, since this initiative is still in very inchoate and preliminary stages the Article
refrains from addressing it in length. See MALCOLM GAMMIE, EU Taxation and the Societas Europaea
- Harmless creature or Trojan Horse?, 44 see id. at 3, 37-9 (2004(; EU COMMISSION, Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social
Committee: An Internal Market Without Company Tax obstacles Achievements, Ongoing Initiatives
and Remaining Challenges 24 (2003).
46
Both are mandatory and require broader base harmonization. Like the CCTB, both would allow
cross-border loss consolidation, and thus would require an agreed upon allocation formula. The
European Union corporate income tax (hereinafter, "the EUCIT") proposal would impose a corporate
tax on the EU rather than the national level. This would eliminate the need for existing national tax
bases. The new corporate tax would be administrated and collected by an EU organ and not by Member
States. The more radical version of this proposal would also require a uniform tax rate. The other
proposal, known as the Harmonized Tax Base (hereinafter, "the HTB") would apply to all business
enterprises. Under this proposal, each Member State would determine its tax rates and administrate the
tax. However, unlike the EUCIT proposal, the HTB proposal does not require any central European tax
administration.
47
EU COMMISSION, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG)
Progress to Date and Future Plans for the CCCTB 15 (2006( (mentioning that the working groups did
not discuss the treatment of intra-group dividend payments); EU COMMISSION, Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee: Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: Progress to Date and Next Steps
Towards a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 8, 11 (2006) (mentioning that experts
from different countries seem to prefer what they know and an annex showing the initial stages of the
discussions on virtually all topics); EU COMMISSION, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
Working Group (CCCTB WG) - CCCTB: Possible Elements of a Technical Outline (2007) (giving a
broad overview of all the issues the CCCTB requires to settle and demonstrating the complexity of the
matters at stake).
48
EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council
and the European Economic and Social Committee: Implementing the Community Program for
Improved Growth and Employment and he Enhanced Competitiveness of EU Business :Further
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proposals, the CCCTB requires devising a formulary allocation mechanism that is
very different from the arm’s-length transfer pricing regimes that Member States’
currently employ. The Commission (justly) regards the ability to consolidate losses
as one of the CCCTB initiative’s main benefits. This loss consolidation is not
possible without an allocation mechanism. Because the CCCTB would apply to
almost all types of EU companies, the revenue impact of these decisions would be
immense. Member States will find it difficult to reach agreements on these issues,
given the high stakes involved. 49
Second, taxpayers can elect whether they are subject to the CCCTB, which
means that, even if it is adopted by the Commission, multiple tax systems would still
operate simultaneously. As in the case of the HST initiative, this means that neither
the administrative and compliance costs, nor the concerns over tax avoidance are
likely to be significantly reduced by the CCCTB initiative. MNEs tend to be
sophisticated and well-advised taxpayers that do not mind spending resources on tax
planning if they perceive them as worthy investments. Therefore, it seems naïve to
think that MNES would elect the CCCTB unless it reduces their overall costs.
Although adopting the CCCTB would reduce their compliance costs, to the extent that
it would increase their effective tax rate, they would not choose it. The CCCTB may
indeed raise the effective tax rate if it succeeds in meeting the Commission’s
objectives of limiting MNEs planning and income-shifting possibilities and
broadening the corporate tax base. 50
This fundamental inconsistency in the CCCTB limits its potential advantages
and reduces its feasibility. Therefore, this Article believes that the CCCTB, currently,
has limited prospects in forwarding the Commission’s integration objectives.
Accordingly, the rest of this discussion focuses on comparing this Article's proposal
with the HST initiative. As elaborated in the previous Part, the agreement costs for
the HST initiative are low. This explains why the Commission regards "the concept

Progress during 2006 and next steps towards a proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB) 6-7 (2007( (discussing the difficulty in reconciling different tax preferences of Member
States and in determining and administrative framework for the proposal); EU COMMISSION, Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG) Progress to Date and Future Plans for
the CCCTB 16 (2006).
49
This part of the CCTB project is in its very early stages. See EU COMMISSION, Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group (CCCTB WG) Progress to Date and Future Plans for
the CCCTB 18 (2006); EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: Implementing the
Community Lisbon Programme: Progress to Date and Next Steps Towards a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 6 (2006); EU COMMISSION, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
Working Group (CCCTB WG) Report and Overview of the Main Issues that Emerged During the
Discussion on the Sharing Mechanism SG6 second meeting – 11 June 2007 at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/C
CCTBWP056_en.pdf (stressing out the different problems and considerations that should be taking into
account when adopting sharing mechanisms).
50
The Commission wishes to promote a broad CCCTB tax base. EU COMMISSION, Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social
Committee: Implementing the Community Program for Improved Growth and Employment and he
Enhanced Competitiveness of EU Business: Further Progress during 2006 and next steps towards a
proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 6 (2007) . Member States will
impose their corporate tax rates on corporations that chose to file under the CCCTB. If the CCCTB tax
rate is indeed broader than the one of most Member States the effective tax rate of MNEs may increase
unless Member States provide CCCTB filers with a special reduced tax rate.
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of Home State Taxation… to be a very promising way of tackling the tax problems
that hamper SMEs when they are expanding across borders." 51

V. The Article’s Proposal: Unitary and Formulary Taxing of the Hard-to-Tax
This Article portrays a different strategy that the Commission should promote
in its efforts to attain its goals of a European corporate tax regime that includes a
harmonized base, loss consolidation, and unitary tax-allocation methodology. It
suggests doing so by providing a comprehensive solution to a targeted problem.
Unlike the Commission’s comprehensive solution, this Article's solution entails a
reformulation of how a specific sector or activity should be taxed through a formulary
or unitary system. The limited scope of this Article’s reformulation is intended to
make its proposal more politically feasible. It suggests that the Commission should
employ a mandatory, unitary sourcing regime on one of the hard-to-tax-sectors as a
pilot for a comprehensive unitary solution. This strategy would allow the Commission
and Member States to gradually implement the European unitary solution and to avoid
the unpredictable groundswell of radical reform. While this Article does not pretend
to offer any spotless textbook solutions, it opts to propose a politically feasible
strategy, which, unlike the HST and CCCTB initiatives, would be able to get a
foothold on the path toward a comprehensive unitary solution.
Current separate accounting and sourcing arrangements fail because they
attempt to trace and assign ownership of mobile assets to specific corporate entities
and jurisdictions. This is an attempt to adhere to obsolete legal forms, which are alien
to the business models that it is supposed to tax. In economic reality, where MNEs
share risks and interests with respect to the mobile assets they hold, create, and utilize,
endorsing specific corporate ownership—rather than MNE ownership—of financial
and intangible assets would be both obsolete and hazardous. 52 Such an endorsement
allows MNEs to utilize their current exceptional capacity to exploit the international
tax system. This, in turn, amplifies the demand for tax-competitive behaviors from
sovereigns and promotes tax base erosion.
As a response to these concerns, this Article argues for a dual sourcing regime.
The cornerstones of this regime are the following: (1) every type of tangible
transaction (or function) for which a reasonable market comparable exists should be
sourced in accordance with the arm’s-length standard (as previously suggested,
preferably according to the CPM method); (2) other types of transaction or functions
(e.g., intangibles-related transactions; transaction involving mobile and easy-tomanipulate MNE resources, such as financial resources) should be sourced according
to formulary methods that rely on immobile indicators. The underlying theme of both
cornerstones is that sourcing should be done by a standardized proxy. This proxy
should be determined according to tangible indicators that demonstrate where MNE
activities are taking place, thus indicating where their profits have been generated.
Although sourcing by such immobile proxies certainly raises some obvious concerns,
51

EU COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament
and the Economic and Social Committee: Tackling the Corporation Tax Obstacles of Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Internal Market – Outline of a Possible Home State Taxation Pilot
Scheme 8, 11 (2005);EU COMMISSION, Home State Taxation, EU Commission. (2006), at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/home_state_taxation/index_en.htm.
52
Elizabeth Chorvat, Forcing Multinationals to Play Fair: Proposals for a Rigorous Transfer Pricing
Theory, 54 ALABAMA L. REV 1251 (2003) (conveying a different opinion that tax authorities could use
advanced risk assessment methods to breakdown the intra-MNE capital formation and risk allocation).
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it would perform better than the present system in halting MNEs’ ability to shift
income.
In two earlier Articles, I developed the idea of a dual sourcing regime that
prescribed formulary sourcing of the income MNEs derive from financial and
intangible-related transactions. More specifically, I argued that for MNEs operating
in the financial sector (hereinafter FMNEs), there is good reason to switch to a fullscale unitary system. The reason is that FMNE income is comprised almost entirely
of income related to financial activities. Because financial activities and assets are
mobile and tax sensitive, the arm’s-length transfer-pricing paradigm simply falls apart
when implemented on these financial Goliaths. Tax authorities simply do not have
sufficient resources to effectively audit the huge volume of sophisticated affiliated
FMNE transactions in according to the arm’s-length standard. Moreover, in the case
of financial transactions, tax authorities also lack a conceptual paradigm to determine
what an arm’s-length standard is. Financial engineering allows these well-advised
taxpayers to construct their capital flows through an infinite number of instruments.
Thus, economically similar positions may have completely different tax consequences
when carried through different financial instruments.
This Article argues that the Commission should adopt a comprehensive FMNE
unitary system or any other comprehensive system that would unitarily source a hardto-tax-sector as the first strategic step of reforming the EU corporate tax. Under the
FMNE unitary system, FMNE earnings would be allocated according to the volume
of economic activity they have in each jurisdiction. This volume would be
determined according to two factors: tangible property and compensation for labor.
Both these factors are immobile and relatively easy for tax authorities to assess. 53
This Article does not wish to pretend that this unitary sourcing solution, as any
other unitary sourcing solution, is a simple one. It does not discuss the proposal itself
with great detail, but rather highlights the key issues that are relevant in the EU
context. This Article’s unitary proposal strives for uniformity in all key elements
other than tax rates. 54 Therefore, the unitary system would have to operate under a
single set of uniform rules that determine the scope of the income tax base, the tax
accounting rules that define the appropriation formula factors, and the composition of
the formula. More importantly, the unitary system should be administrated by a
centralized agency, probably a branch of the Commission, which would be
responsible for its coherent and transparent implementation. For the purposes of this
Article, it is not necessary to elaborate upon the precise set of rules that would
comprise the income tax base and tax accounting conventions. Almost any uniform
set of reasonable and broad-base rules would involve fewer compliance costs and
abuse possibilities than the twenty-seven sets of tax rules currently employed. The
political costs of agreement required by such uniformity are discussed in the next Part.
A number of problems may result from attempting to implement a unitary
solution in an insufficiently integrated political setting. First, and most notably, the
emphasis of the suggested formula on labor compensation as a benchmark for
sourcing is problematic due to the different wage structures in various Member States.
To actively promote such a proposal, the Commission has to control for the different

53

ILAN BENSHALOM, The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an
Allocation Phase Va. Tax Rev. (forthcomming, 2008) (elaborating on this proposal in great details).
54
CHARLES E. MCLURE, Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm's Length Standard with
Formulary Apportionment, 56 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 586, 598 (2002(.
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costs of living and the different price levels in different Member States. 55 This would
provide incentives for the new (and poorer) Member States to support the proposal.
The proposal’s emphasis on the importance of the payroll factor also poses significant
political problems, because tying the sourcing of FMNEs to the payroll imposes an
implicit tax on labor. Given the high unemployment rates in many Member States, it
would be difficult for the Commission to persuade them to impose such a tax.
Second, another source of difficulty with this Article's proposal is its attempt
to place a multinational unitary system within an international tax regime based on a
decentralized network of bilateral tax treaties. 56 These treaties subscribe to a number
of soft-law principles that adhere to the concepts of separate tax accounting and
arm’s-length sourcing. The vast majority of FMNEs in question would have nonEuropean branches and subsidiaries. In the absence of an agreement on the
international level, the transactions affiliated with these branches and subsidiaries
would be sourced by traditional separate accounting mechanisms. This would require
the FMNE taxing authority to employ a single set of transfer pricing rules to source
these transactions. The unitary rules would also have to include a set of uniform CFC
and thin capitalization provisions.
Under the unitary system, internal flows of capital resources within the
European components of the FMNEs would be completely flexible and free of tax
costs. If one assumes that no single set of withholding taxes could be attained
(because of Member States' double taxation treaty obligations with third countries), it
is crucial to develop some mechanism of sourcing foreign operations to avoid severe
problems of treaty shopping. 57 This requires the Commission to implement some
55

KATHLEEN MATTHEWS, U.S. and Canadian Officials Discuss APAs in the Global Trading Context;
Advance Pricing Agreements, 8 Tax Notes International 1362, 1363 (1994).
56
VICTOR ZONANA, International Tax Policy in the New Millennium: Developing an Agenda, 26
Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 1253, 1254 (2001). There are a number of alternative approaches to this problem.
A first approach will allow this jurisdictional shopping. This approach may open a too wide of a
planning hole in many of the Member States' tax systems. This in turn could endanger the integrity of
the unitary system. A second approach would determine a quasi corporate residency rule and attribute
all the foreign transactions for withholding tax purposes to it. Although this may seem as an easy and
practical solution, its clinging to the residency benchmark is wasteful and antithetical to the enterprise
of formulating a unitary system and thus it should be rejected. A third approach would attribute
FMNEs foreign related activities according to a formula. Under this approach, the volume of foreign
transactions that would be attributed to each of the FMNEs' jurisdiction would be determined in
accordance with the relative level of activity in that geographic location. The level of activity will be
determined in accordance with the relative income share of each jurisdiction. For example, assume a
European FMNE, operating in the UK and Germany. In a given fiscal year (any type of time
framework could be used for this purpose) 70% of the FMNEs income was attributed to the UK and
30% to Germany. During that year it paid 1000 euros as dividends to its American Parent. In this
scenario the amount of dividend attributed to the UK and Germany for withholding tax purposes would
be 700 and 300 euros, respectively. Albeit this solution is feasible, it does require separate accounting
for different types of foreign transactions. This sheds a shadow of doubt whether the Article's proposal
would succeed in attaining its ambitions of compliance burden reduction and simplification. The
answer to this question is a factual one, which largely depends on the relative weight of EU
transactions v. foreign transactions in European FMNEs activities. It is nevertheless crucial to
recognize that under the current separate accounting systems, taxpayers are not only require to hold
separate accounting methods for financial transactions within Europe but also have to deal with twentyseven different rules of how to keep those accounts.
57
For instance, assume an FMNE operating in the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany. Further
assume that this FMNE wishes to conduct business with an affiliated (or non-affiliated) company in a
non EU tax haven jurisdiction, which has a favorable tax treaty with the Netherlands. In a unitary
setting, there is basically nothing to prevent it from channeling many of its transactions through the
Netherlands to obtain the most tax efficient results.
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type of anti-avoidance rule. 58 However, even if the Commission does not advance
such a rule, the proposal will still be valid because it is not supposed to provide a
flawless alternative but rather only a better one. Since the current anti-treaty shopping
arrangements are by and large ineffective, FMNEs already freely channel their
financial flows to attain the best available withholding tax treatment.
The EU has a long history of tax competition with regard to financial
activities. 59 The Commission's earliest initiatives recognized that tax differentiation
in the effective taxation of financial intermediaries is one of the biggest tax obstacles
in preventing a liberalized and efficient allocation of capital.60 If subject to a
harmonized tax system free of cross-border obstacles, European capital markets will
become more centralized in their management, more flexible in the way they allocate
their resources, and more competitive. By that same token, if nothing changes, it is
also clear that as the economic integration of European financial markets advances,
EU taxpayers and tax-authorities will witness a growth in compliance, administrative,
planning and avoidance costs—all of which are costs inherent to maintaining twentyseven different tax systems. The financial sector is unique because it deals solely
with mobile intangible assets. Furthermore, financial engineering allows taxpayers to
reach equivalent economic positions through different types of legal contracts.
Therefore, in many cases these assets do not have market comparables because there
is no one correct way of structuring financial transactions. While taxing FMNEs
through a unitary setting is by no means a panacea, it over-performs the current use of
twenty-seven separate accounting regimes to source FMNEs. The growth in the
volume of FMNE affiliated financial transactions and their complexity, the
anticipated growth of the FMNE business sector, the significant deadweight of the
international transfer-pricing regime, and the current inequities in the distribution of
revenue all indicate that adopting the Article’s suggested unitary reform is worth its
transition and uncertainty costs. This conclusion resonates with the growing
recognition of both policymakers and members of the financial industry that any EU
corporate tax reform should include the financial sector as well. 61

VI. General Attributes of the EU Strategy Towards Implementing Unitary Taxation
The Commission has embraced the first few steps on the long road towards
unitary taxation. Most importantly, it recognized the arm’s-length standard's limited
prospects and the need to shift its tax policy emphasis from problems of harmful tax
competition and adequate pricing methodologies to the core problems of revenue
allocation within an integrated market. This Article does not wish to open an in-depth
discussion of the well known unitary v. arm’s-length debate. It does, nevertheless,
58
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wish to engage in a meaningful discussion regarding the strategy of attaining a
comprehensive unitary EU corporate tax regime.
In an attempt to elicit the principles necessary to attain unitary reform in the
EU, this Part compares the proposal of the HST initiative with that advocated by this
Article. Both proposals share some common features. First, both depart from the
traditional wisdom of international tax law policymaking. Rather than refining highly
factitious ad hoc pricing mechanisms, such as the APA arrangements and the profitsplit transfer-pricing methodologies, both proposals seek to provide a unitary default
rule targeting affiliated-transaction sourcing hurdles.
Second, each proposal applies only to a relatively small, yet significant, sector.
By limiting their scope, the proposals bypass the problem inherent to the CCCTB
initiative, which requires policymakers to agree upon an inclusive corporate income
tax base and formula. This limited nature of the Article’s proposal and the HST
initiative seems necessary to avoid the conceptual difficulty of writing a new
corporate income tax base. More importantly, this limited nature enhances the
political feasibility of the proposals and allows both proposals to avoid the potential
groundswell of overall corporate tax reform. The sectors on which the two proposals
focus are similar, in the sense that the separate accounting systems contained in each
leads to grave (albeit different) fallouts.
Third, both proposals promote efficiency in their respective sectors, since they
reduce problems of double taxation and tax distortions associated with MNEs
organizational and finance structures.
Fourth, both proposals reduce (but not eliminate) the compliance and
administration problems associated with transfer pricing and thin capitalization.
Fifth, by employing a consolidated tax base along with a unitary allocation
system, both proposals reduce biases against foreign investments. By doing so, both
proposals highlight the connection between the unitary solution and the removal of
tax obstacles slowing European market integration.
Finally, the problems both proposals entail can be traced to a similar source:
the attempt to insulate a certain unitary activity in an arm’s-length world.
The most fundamental difference between the proposals is the tradeoff they
make with regard to the costs of the political agreements necessary for a smoothly
functioning unitary system. The proponents of the HST initiative choose to avoid
these costs by allowing multiple unitary systems to coexist and by making the
proposed regime electable. In contrast, the Article's proposal emphasizes the need for
a uniform mandatory regime, which entails significant costs for formulating a single
FMNE income tax base, uniform tax accounting principles and, most importantly, a
single European FMNE tax administration.
When evaluating the two proposals, it is important to recognize that both offer
some type of transitional tax regime. This point suggests that the proposals should be
primarily evaluated in terms of how well they promote the Commission's final goals.
This Part's analysis explores whether the enhanced agreement costs required by this
Article's proposals are indeed an investment worth making.
This point should be answered on a number of different layers, according to
the different evaluation criteria for multinational tax reform.
A. Compliance costs—Although having a single unitary tax is beneficial for a
great number of reasons, the primary benchmark for its success is its ability to reduce
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compliance and administrative costs. 62 Any departure from the status-quo entails a
set of potential losers. Accordingly, it is important that the proposed unitary change
reduces all parties' compliance and administrative burdens. This type of Pareto
improvement in compliance and administrative cost reduction is the main guarantee
for the reform’s viability. On these terms, this Article’s proposal is more successful,
because it provides a uniform and therefore easier tax regime to administrate and with
which to comply. 63
B. Fiscal viability—Another benchmark by which the proposals should be
evaluated is their ability to provide solid revenue grounds in an era of tax competition
and exceeding fiscal obligations. In this respect, it is worth noting that both proposals
could increase tax competition tendencies. Unitary taxation essentially is a territorial
system, which taxes business profits only once at the source. Thus, implementing it
without any type of tax-rate coordination increases the risk of a tax-competitive race
to the bottom among Member States seeking to attract investments by reducing
corporate tax rates and increasing cash/tax subsidies. 64 However, the adoption of the
HST initiative jeopardizes a different sort of tax-base competition. The tax-base
competition under the HST initiative would allow Member States, which seek to
attract corporate headquarters to their jurisdictions by narrowing corporate tax bases,
to reduce the effective tax rates of other Member States by exporting their own tax
advantages. 65 This type of competition is arguably more pernicious since it is less
transparent, and thus requires less political accountability. 66 Furthermore, the
electability of the HST initiative is in many senses a license for tax avoidance. The
enhanced friction points among its different systems enable SMEs to engage in tax
planning and to seek tax arbitrage. In contrast, this Article's proposal offers a more
sensible method of allocation under which the effective tax rate in each jurisdiction is
determined by the level of economic activity in a respective location, and not by the
country of its corporate residence.
C. Learning externalities—Both proposals aim to initiate a wider process of
unitary corporate taxation in the EU. Thus, the Article assesses both proposals with
respect to the institutional knowledge the Commission is expected to gain from their
implementation. The HST is fundamentally different from any comprehensive
unitary corporate tax solution the Commission may seek to promote, so there is little
operational knowledge that could be gained by facilitating it. In sharp contrast, this
Article's proposal offers a longstanding solution to the problem associated with
sourcing FMNE affiliated transactions. If a comprehensive EU unitary solution is
eventually established, industries with unique characteristics, such as the financial
sector, may still require a unique formula. 67 Thus, the political and administrative
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resources invested in promoting this Article's proposal will not be in vain once the
Commission begins mobilizing the process of attaining a more comprehensive
solution. More significantly, the proposal provides the Commission and Member
State tax authorities with the necessary institutional knowledge to combat the
difficulties of delineating and operating a unitary system. Implementing the unitary
sourcing solution in the limited financial sector setting will allow tax policymakers to
control the transition costs of shifting to a unitary system. Accordingly, the costs of
establishing the uniformity required under this Article's proposal should be seen as an
investment towards future benefits in the pursuit for a comprehensive tax solution.
D. Political learning—The institutional experience of having a centralized
FMNE tax authority is crucial. Most tax disputes involve a national tax authority and
a taxpayer. However, in the context of this Article’s discussion, tax disputes are most
likely to arise among tax authorities. In light of this insight, policymakers should
remember that the adoption of the HST initiative would create a cleft in Member
States’ tax systems. This Article's proposal helps promote the idea that no crossborder European tax reform is possible so long as Member States are not willing to
reform their own tax systems. 68 This Article's proposal prevails over the HST
initiative because Member States need to internalize the need for a centralized
authority, rather than mutual recognition of one another’s tax systems, to remove tax
obstacles. It also promotes a more transparent multinational tax regime that would
enhance political accountability (of the Commission, Member States, and lobbying
groups) to delineating tax policy. This would require tax authorities to address the
revenue and distributive impacts of having a unitary system. The FMNE unitary
system is an avenue by which the EU could address these issues, which are likely to
play a vital role in its attempts to self determine its profile as a political entity.
E. National fiscal sovereignty—One of the core obstacles in the
implementation of an EU unitary system is the intuitive link Member States make
between national fiscal sovereignty and separate accounting systems. This, of course,
is an illusion. This conception of fiscal sovereignty is very formalistic, and therefore
inconsistent, with the notion of substantive fiscal sovereignty in an internal market. 69
In reality, Member State tax regimes intertwine so intimately that their tax policy
decisions are unquestionably dependent on each other. 70 Through coordination, states
can sustain a reasonable and reliable flow of revenues. This would enable them to
achieve a higher level of control in developing more equitable public-financing
systems and governmental expenditure schemes. 71 In contrast, when divided,
Members States are ruled by the prisoner's dilemma and coerced to subordinate their
national fiscal considerations to global market forces. 72 Both the HST and this
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Article's proposals threaten the myth that separate accounting promotes fiscal
sovereignty. 73 However, the HST initiative is in many senses a double-edge sword.
On the one hand, it allows Member States to maintain their autonomy with respect to
their ability to shape their own tax bases. On the other hand, the HST initiative
reduces the actual ability of Member States to exercise control over the taxation of
commercial activities in their own source jurisdiction. Moreover, sovereign power to
tax is lost in favor of other unaccountable political processes taking place in other
Member States. Consider the following example. [A] is a Member State that elects to
participate in the HST regime. [A], which has a service-driven economy, implements
accelerated depreciation rules for heavy machinery. The major impact of these rules
would be borne by Member States with industry-driven economies participating in the
HST regime. Corporate residents of country [A] may elect to file tax returns using the
benefits of these accelerated depreciation rates in other source jurisdictions. This
Article's proposal grants each Member State the ability to participate in the political
process that generates the tax rules to which it would be subjected under the proposal.
Just like any other type of common action, this type of subordination to a decisionmaking process is the only avenue open to Member States to enhance their
substantive fiscal sovereignty.

VII. Conclusions
The EU tax policy is at a crossroad where it has to decide whether to take the
path of integration. 74 This Article suggests that although the Commission has
promulgated its endorsement of corporate income tax integration, the initiatives it
took, namely the HST initiative, show that this endorsement was half-hearted at the
very best.
We are living in an age in which the power of domestic tax authorities have
become considerably smaller than the scope of the transactions, income-producing
activities, institutions, and markets that these tax-authorities are supposed to
efficiently and equitably tax. The CCCTB initiative entrenches and the HST initiative
even enhances the difference among various EU tax regimes. This Article’s proposal
promotes targeted comprehensive reform in one of the hard-to-tax sectors, such as the
financial sector. This is a politically feasible strategy that allows the EU to start the
process of converging the different European tax regimes into a single EU corporate
income tax regime.
There is an old Hasidic fable about an ageing father who had two sons. He did
not know which one of them should take his place in managing the family farm and
decided to test them by giving them a task. He showed each of them a different parcel
of land which had one large boulder in it and a lot of small rocks. He told them that
to cultivate the land both parcels should be clear by the next day. The older son spent
half of the day clearing the rocks. Once he finished, he was already a bit tired and the
task of moving the boulder looked so great that he decided to postpone it to the next
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day. The younger son started the day by moving the boulder – it took him half a day
of hard work to push it out of the parcel’s boundaries. Once he completed that part of
his task moving the rocks was more like a rest for him. Accordingly, he finished
clearing the parcel in that same day and replaced his father in managing the farm.
By choosing to advance the HST initiative, the Commission has chosen to
move the small rocks first. This strategy begs the question of whether the task of
moving the big boulders blocking the road to EU corporate income tax integration
would be feasible at all. This Article’s strategy, on the other hand, starts with a big
boulder; it requires more effort and political risk-taking, but it is bound to be more
rewarding.
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